Thus many contemporary thinkers adopt a physicalist view of the mental realm because they think that otherwise we will be unable to explain how mental processes can causally influence our bodies and other physical items.Similar considerations motivate ontologically naturalist views of the biological realm, the social realm, and so on.The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily accept naturalism as just characterized—that is, they would both reject “supernatural” entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the “human spirit”.
They urged that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing “supernatural”, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the “human spirit” (Krikorian 1944; Kim 2003).
So understood, “naturalism” is not a particularly informative term as applied to contemporary philosophers.
However, familiarity with the relevant scientific history casts the matter in a different light.
It turns out that naturalist doctrines, far from varying with ephemeral fashion, are closely responsive to received scientific opinion about the range of causes that can have physical effects.
The self-proclaimed “naturalists” from that period included John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook and Roy Wood Sellars.
These philosophers aimed to ally philosophy more closely with science.
The modern history of psychology, biology, social science and even physics itself can usefully be seen as hinging on changing attitudes to naturalist ontological principles and naturalist methodological precepts.
This entry, however, will be concerned solely with naturalist doctrines that are specific to philosophy.
The important thing is to articulate and assess the reasoning that has led philosophers in a generally naturalist direction, not to stipulate how far you need to travel along this path before you can count yourself as a paid-up “naturalist”.
As indicated by the above characterization of the mid-twentieth-century American movement, naturalism can be separated into an ontological and a methodological component.
Comments Causal Closure Thesis
Naturalism Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Feb 22, 2007. The causal closure thesis implied that, if mental and other special causes are to produce physical effects, they must themselves be physically.…
The Causal Closure Of Physics An Explanation And Critique
Keywords Causal Closure, Physicalism, Dualism, Completeness, Mental States. efficacious roles within the physical realm and thus contradict the CC thesis.…
Mind and the Causal Exclusion Problem Internet.
The principle of physical causal closure indicates that physical events only have. This co-instantiation thesis, applied to the mental causation debate, suggests.…
Two Conceptions of the Physical Daniel Stoljar - CiteSeerX
Tetrad of theses 1 if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; 2 a priori. In support of 3 are considerations of the causal closure of the physical.…
Problems of Mental Causation - Whether and How It Can Exist
Kim recognizes correctly that anomalous monism is a negative thesis It tells. both mental to physical causation and physical causal closure; and whether or.…
DOC Is the Causal Closure Argument devastating to dualism.
Introduction In order for the causal closure argument to be devastating to. It's beyond the scope of this essay to argue for dualism; but for the purposes of this.…
On a Loophole in Causal Closure SpringerLink
Feb 15, 2017. Causal closure is linked to the principle that no cause of. Mind in a Physical World An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental.…
Why the Argument from Causal Closure Against the Existence.
Way of stating the principle of Causal Closure CC is this 'If you pick any. Kim, J. 1998, Mind in a Physical World An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem.…