But since we affirm and deny statements, similarly then the silent affirmation and denial of a thought is what we call judgement. Taylor comments: “Imagination, in this passage, thus means more particularly the mental interpretation of an actual sense-perception, which may, of course, often be erroneous, as in an example used in the …”4 In other words, ‘appearing’ is the silent affirmation or denial (the ‘taking’ or the ‘not taking’) of what my senses tell me.
The example in the Philebus, referred to by Taylor, illustrates Plato’s view that perceptual judgement, and the endeavour to form such a judgement, always spring from memory and perception in the following way: A man sees an object at a distance not very clearly and so asks himself, “What is that which appears (phantazomenon) to be standing by the rock under the trees?
In Ancient Greece, people known as philosophers began contemplating the world in a different light.
They had a different way of thinking than what was normal in the day.
Memory and perception coincide, and together with the experiences relative to them they seem almost like writing statements in the soul.
When this ‘writing experience’ writes truly, then true judgements and true statements are formed within us as the consequence of its work – but when the scribe within us writes falsely, the result is the opposite.Plato’s aim at this point was to counter the Sophist’s contention that there can be no such thing as falsehood unless a connection is shown between discourse, judgement and appearing on the one hand, with not-being, on the other. somebody’s stating or saying “Theaetetus is flying” can be false, viz.in that it combines a real subject (Theaetetus) with a real action (flying) but in a way other than that which is the case, since Theaetetus is now sitting, Plato now asks: “What then of thought, judgement and appearing?(ii) We also have an apt way of expressing Aristotle’s account of appearing, that is given later in this chapter, and which is couched in explicitly causal terms.2 Aristotle has various arguments to show that ) rightly or wrongly.It is not, therefore, for him sense-perception, opinion (judgement), scientific knowledge or intuition.While others practiced paganism and worshipped the Gods of Olympus, philosophers thought about the body, the soul, and ways to create a better world.Greek philosophers are still known today and their works are still being read and taught. One topic that philosophers frequently discuss is politics and government. Is the one they have now satisfactory or could it be better?” And he may answer, rightly “A man”, or mistakenly, “A statue”.(As in the Sophist Plato remarks that the statement (logos) is the loud version of the judgement (doxa).) He now offers the following explanation of this mental act: The soul, at such times, is like a book.There are, I think, two advantages in preferring the ‘appearing’ terminology to that of ‘presentation’: (i) We retain in this way the connection, present in the Greek, with the passive forms of the verb “to appear”.So, we can have the awkward but intelligible “the appearing(s)” for “to[ta]phainetai”, “[the] Being appeared to” for “[to]phainesthai” and “appearance” for “phantasma”.